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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
EDITED BY RICHARD B. BILDER

REVIEW ESSAY

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE AT
THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN
HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HUMANITARIAN LAW
The Drone Memos: Targeted Killing, Secrecy
and the Law. Edited by Jameel Jaffer.
New York, New York: The New Press,
2016. Pp. 352. $27.95.
Theoretical Boundaries of Armed Conﬂict and
Human Rights. Edited by Jens David
Ohlin.
New
York:
Cambridge
University Press, 2016. Pp. xiii, 402.
Index. $125.
U.S. White House, Report on the Legal and
Policy Frameworks Guiding the United States’
Use of Military Force and Related National
Security Operations (Dec. 2016), available
at https://drive.google.com/ﬁle/d/0BwJjW
6kOLfgicmlfX2hYWHNUTlE/view.
doi:10.1017/ajil.2017.78
The United States is more than ﬁfteen years
into a ﬁght against terrorism that shows no sign
of abating and, with the change in administration, appears to be intensifying. Other Western
democracies that have historically been uneasy
about U.S. counterterrorism policies have, in
recent years, shifted toward those policies.1 And
1

See, e.g., Anthony Dworkin, Europe’s New
Counter-terror Wars, at 2 (European Council on
Foreign Relations Policy Brief Oct. 2016) (reviewing
the counterterrorism policies of several European states
and concluding that “there has been a notable and
largely unremarked convergence between European

armed nonstate groups continue to commit
large-scale acts of violence in multiple distinct
theaters. The legal issues that these situations present are not entirely new, but neither are they
going away. Recent publications, like the three
works under review, thus provide useful opportunities to reﬂect on and reﬁne our thinking on
them.
All three works concern the international legal
regulation of contemporary security operations.
The Drone Memos focuses on the U.S. practice
of using lethal force against suspected terrorists
in other states. Jameel Jaffer, a former ACLU
Deputy Legal Director, introduces the volume
with a scathing critique of the practice. He then
collects sixteen ofﬁcial speeches or documents,
dating from February 2010 to July 2016, that
outline the U.S. government’s positions on
these operations. In December 2016, the government released another document, the White
House Report on Legal and Policy Frameworks
Guiding the United States’ Use of Military Force
and Related National Security Operations. This
document was the Obama Administration’s
ﬁnal and most comprehensive presentation of
its legal and policy positions on the ﬁght against
terrorism. The Report addresses not only lethal
operations but also, for example, the extradition,
treatment, and administrative detention of suspected terrorists. Theoretical Boundaries of
Armed Conﬂict and Human Rights is more academically oriented and broader in scope. A few
of the essays in this compilation also focus on
the U.S. practice, but most tackle more general
questions about the relationship between international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL).
and US approaches to military action against terrorists,
after many years when they differed widely”).
1063
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All of the works are well done and worth reading. Yet those who have been following the issues
for some time are likely to ﬁnd that the material
is, on the whole, stale. This is not to say that the
authors do not offer new insights; they do. At this
point, however, the ﬁeld is saturated, and most of
the analytic moves are familiar. In this review
essay, I use the three works to take stock of the
secondary literature on IHL and IHRL, and to
propose a shift in its focus.

I. TWO ROUTINE SCRIPTS
International lawyers who address contemporary counterterrorism operations routinely take
two approaches. One is to assess speciﬁc operations under international law. The second is to
propose reforms for clarifying the law. These
moves share a jurisprudential vision—a view of
how international law in this area does or should
function. They assume that IHL and IHRL work
by establishing relatively clear codes of conduct to
constrain human behavior.

A. Examining U.S. Practice
Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks,
the United States has stood out both for the
expansive scope of its counterterrorism operations and for the novel legal interpretations that
it has advanced to justify these operations. As
such, the U.S. practice has been central to debates
about the relationship between IHL and IHRL.
Several of the essays under review criticize that
practice; the ofﬁcial documents in The Drone
Memos and the December 2016 White House
Report aim to explain and defend it.
Jameel Jaffer’s introductory essay in The Drone
Memos is a powerful indictment of U.S. lethal
operations. Jaffer’s strongest policy argument is
that these operations are ineffective at suppressing the terrorism threat. He contends that,
although drone strikes eliminate particular suspects, they breed resentment that militant groups
exploit to recruit new members. As Jaffer puts it,
“the United States is caught in a seemingly inescapable loop: the threat of terrorism supposedly
necessitates drone strikes, but drone strikes inarguably fuel the terrorist threat” (p. 20). This
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claim ought to be taken seriously and assessed
empirically.
My focus here, however, is on Jaffer’s international legal argument. Jaffer takes issue with the
U.S. claim that IHL governs all of its extraterritorial security operations. The crux of his argument
is as follows:
[T]he claim that the United States was
engaged in a borderless war against terrorist
groups . . . permitted the Obama administration to contend that drone strikes—
even those carried out “away from the zone
of actual hostilities”—were governed not by
human rights law, which bars the use of
lethal force except in very limited circumstances, but by the laws of war, which are
more permissive of state violence and less
protective of individual rights. If the administration had conceded that human rights
law governed, the United States would
have been legally empowered to use lethal
force only as a last resort, and only in
response to concrete and speciﬁc threats
that were truly imminent. Where human
rights law controlled, the entire apparatus
of the drone campaign . . . would have
been obviously and inarguably unlawful.
(P. 38)
Jaffer’s argument is that, in invoking IHL worldwide, the United States claims expansive authority to kill people, displacing the much more
restrictive standards that would otherwise apply
as a matter of IHRL.
This argument against the U.S. position is
familiar. For example, Jonathan Horowitz’s contribution to Theoretical Boundaries also contests
the U.S. claim of a global armed conﬂict. Like
Jaffer, Horowitz emphasizes that the U.S. claim
is potentially very broad. It would enable a state
to use IHL “to target an enemy ﬁghter with lethal
force anywhere he or she goes in the world”
(p. 158).
The argument is rhetorically powerful, and
Jaffer’s articulation of it is particularly formidable. But as of 2016, it was in at least two respects
overdrawn. First, Jaffer’s assertion that U.S. lethal
operations would be “obviously and inarguably
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unlawful” under IHRL is incorrect. The IHRL
standard that Jaffer articulates—that states may
use “lethal force only as a last resort, and only
in response to concrete and speciﬁc threats that
were truly imminent”—applies in law enforcement contexts in which the threats are relatively
modest, and states have considerable situational
control. Even in such settings, IHRL does not
really establish a rule of last resort. It does not
require states to pursue every available alternative
for addressing a threat before resorting to force. It
requires states to pursue the alternatives that are
reasonable in the circumstances. As I have
explained elsewhere, the question of whether particular measures are reasonable turns heavily on
the context.2
Because the IHRL standard is fact-dependent,
human rights institutions tend to apply it loosely
when they assess conduct outside law enforcement settings—when situations are more chaotic, and states have less operational control.
Consider a series of decisions by the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) arising out
of Russia’s responses to internal terrorism. In
Isayeva v. Russia, the court suggested that
Russia could lawfully target to kill Chechen ﬁghters, even absent the kind of imminent threat that
IHRL usually requires.3 In Khatsiyeva v. Russia, it
left open the question of whether a state could
lawfully use lethal force against someone merely
because he was armed or failed to comply with
ofﬁcial safety instructions—possibilities that
would be unthinkable in a law enforcement
setting.4 And in Finogenov v. Russia, the court
expressly recognized that IHRL applies more
leniently when the facts so require—there,
because Russia was pressed for time and lacked
situational control.5
2
See Monica Hakimi, A Functional Approach to
Targeting and Detention, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1365,
1392–95 (2012); Monica Hakimi, Taking Stock of
the Law on Targeting, Part I, EJIL TALK! (Dec. 12,
2016), at http://www.ejiltalk.org/taking-stock-of-thelaw-on-targeting-part-i.
3
Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57950/00, 41 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 791, 833 (2005).
4
Khatsiyeva v. Russia, App. No. 5108/02, paras.
134–39 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2008).
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The ECtHR has hinted that IHRL might also
be less stringent when it regulates a state’s extraterritorial conduct. In Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom,
the court decided that the IHRL obligation to
investigate state killings “continues to apply in difﬁcult security conditions, including in a context of
armed conﬂict.”6 Yet the court then noted that the
form of any investigation “may vary depending on
the circumstances.”7 “[C]oncrete constraints may
compel the use of less effective measures of investigation or may cause an investigation to be
delayed.”8 Such constraints can be expected
when a state engages in counterterrorism operations outside its own territory. In these circumstances, the state is unlikely to have the full
arsenal of tools and institutions that, back home,
allow it to achieve its legitimate security interests
while satisfying the strictest human rights standards. In short, even if IHRL governs U.S. lethal
operations, its substantive requirements would be
fact-dependent and are not yet settled. It would
not “obviously and inarguably” prohibit the
“entire apparatus” of the U.S. drone program, as
Jaffer contends.
Second, Jaffer’s argument against the worldwide application of IHL is misdirected because,
as of 2016, the United States insisted that it
would apply IHL’s targeting standards only in
areas of active hostilities or other “extraordinary
circumstances” (pp. 256–57). Outside those situations, the 2013 Presidential Policy Guidance
(PPG)9 provide for the United States to use lethal
5

Finogenov v. Russia, App. No. 18299, para. 211
(Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011) (“[T]he Court may occasionally
depart from that rigorous standard of ‘absolute necessity’ . . . [if] its application may be simply impossible
where . . . the authorities had to act under tremendous
time pressure and where their control of the situation
was minimal.”).
6
Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07,
para. 164 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011).
7
Id., para. 165.
8
Id., para. 164.
9
Presidential Policy Guidance: Procedures for
Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets
Located Outside the United States and Areas of
Active Hostilities (May 22, 2013), available at
https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-library/procedures_
for_approving_direct_action_against_terrorist_targets/
download.
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force only: (1) against a target that poses a “continuing, imminent threat to U.S. persons”; (2)
“when capture of an individual is not feasible
and no other reasonable alternatives,” including
action by the territorial state, “exist to effectively
address the threat”; and (3) with “[n]ear certainty
that a lawful target is present” and “that noncombatants will not be injured or killed” in the
operation (pp. 255–56). The outer bounds of
the PPG have never been clear, but they are in
any event narrower than what the global application of IHL would permit. Moreover, as a practical matter, the vast majority of U.S. lethal
operations have occurred in places like Yemen,
Somalia, and the tribal areas of Pakistan—
where the ordinary tools of law enforcement
were compromised due to the recognized government’s diminished authority or control.
Criticizing the U.S. practice on the merits is,
of course, fair game. For instance, Jaffer rightly
notes that the United States deﬁnes “combatant”
broadly, to include many people who would not
qualify under more mainstream deﬁnitions. That
deﬁnition dilutes the U.S. claim that it rarely kills
or injures non-combatants. But to attack the
United States for applying IHL’s permissive standards worldwide is to paint with too broad a
brush (at least for now). As Jaffer himself concedes, the PPG “gestured toward human rights
principles” and was “in part a concession to
those who rejected the paradigm of borderless
war” (p. 40).
What really seems to drive Jaffer’s legal critique is his concern that the U.S. executive
branch is unbounded by law in conducting
these operations. Jaffer attacks the PPG because
its targeting standards are “cherry picked from
different legal regimes” and discretionary, rather
than legally required (p. 7). For him, the “mishmash of ideas borrowed from different legal paradigms” (p. 40) is troubling because it is part of
how the U.S. executive branch evades legal controls on its behavior. “If this is law,” Jaffer proclaims, “it is law without limits—law without
constraint” (p. 7).
A similar concern animates other essays under
review. Naz Modirzadeh’s chapter in Theoretical
Boundaries nicely tracks how the participants in
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debates about U.S. counterterrorism operations
invoked, applied, and adapted IHL and IHRL
over time. Modirzadeh characterizes the resultant
U.S. legal positions as
“folk international law,” a law-like discourse
that relies on a confusing and soft admixture
of IHL, jus ad bellum, and IHRL to frame
operations that do not, ultimately, seem to
be bound by international law—or at least
by any conception of international law recognizable to international lawyers, especially
non-Americans. (P. 194)
A big concern for Modirzadeh, as for Jaffer, is that
under the U.S. approach “IHL functions not as
binding international law regulating the behavior
of the armed forces and armed groups . . . but
rather as a free-ﬂoating and shifting set of principles that provide guidance for how to kill ethically” (p. 224). Thus, she says that the U.S.
approach calls into question “[t]he extent to
which international law can meaningfully constrain authority during the tumult of armed conﬂict and other situations of lethal force . . . ”
(p. 231).
Kevin Jon Heller’s chapter also complains
about the U.S. method for identifying the legal
standards that govern its counterterrorism operations. According to Heller, the United States
consistently invokes permissive standards by
drawing dubious analogies between international
armed conﬂicts and the situations in which it
conducts these operations. Heller acknowledges
that other global actors also apply IHL and
IHRL by analogy. One big difference, he says,
is that those other actors treat their analogized
rules as customary international law. The
United States “has never claimed that the rules
it applies by analogy have achieved customary
[legal] status” (p. 235). Here again, the complaint
is that the United States denies being meaningfully constrained by international law.
So, a lot of what animates the pieces that criticize the U.S. practice is not just, as Jens Ohlin
puts it in Theoretical Boundaries, that there is “a
profound ad hockery in U.S. legal positions,
which often involve mixing and matching
between legal standards and legal frameworks
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. . .” (p. 18). After all, the U.S. executive branch is
not alone in crafting hybrid norms for situations
in which neither IHL nor IHRL provides all of
the answers. Human rights courts,10 the
International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC),11 and national courts12 also mix and
match IHL, IHRL, and domestic law. The
worry seems to be that, in cherry picking from
different regimes, the United States is evading
legal constraints on its behavior.

B. Arguing for Legal Clarity
A similar worry animates the second routine
script on the relationship between IHL and
IHRL—which is not to insist that the law is
clear and being violated but to acknowledge
and then try to resolve its evident uncertainties.
Ohlin’s contributions to Theoretical Boundaries
are illustrative. His introductory chapter emphasizes that, for many counterterrorism operations,
the governing regime and standards of behavior
are unsettled. He claims that “there is not even
agreement on whether the regimes, in this case
IHL and IHRL, are complementary or competing” (p. 21). He warns that, now that IHRL
has become more ambitious, the two regimes
are approaching an “inescapable collision”
(p. 4). For Ohlin, that conﬂict must be resolved:
“the day will soon come when public international law will be forced to adopt a clear understanding of how IHL and IHRL interact with
each other. . .” (id.).
Ohlin then proposes a way to address the
“seemingly intractable problem” that he
10
E.g., Hassan v. United Kingdom, App. 29750/09,
paras. 96–111 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2014); Case of the
“Mapiripán Massacre” v. Colombia, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, 2005 Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 134, paras. 114–15 (Sept. 15).
11
E.g., NILS MELZER, ICRC, INTERPRETIVE
GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION
IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW 77–82 (2009).
12
E.g., infra notes 24–25 and accompanying text
(discussing Israeli and U.K. judicial decisions);
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)
(J. O’Connor, plurality) (using a mix of U.S. domestic
law and IHL principles to uphold, and then to impose
procedural limits on, the government’s authority to
detain people administratively).
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identiﬁes (p. 21). He argues that, when a government acts as a sovereign exercising control over its
subjects, the substantive standards ought to come
from IHRL. By contrast, when it acts as a belligerent—by which he basically means a party to an
armed conﬂict—the relevant regime is IHL.
Ohlin defends that distinction by explaining
that IHL standards “are reciprocal in the sense
that they apply to both parties to the armed conﬂict (even non-state actors), whereas [IHRL standards] are asymmetrical because they only apply
to governmental entities capable of exercising
sovereign power” (p. 129). Again, Ohlin draws
the distinction in order to resolve the uncertainties that arise when IHL and IHRL are both
potentially in play but appear to conﬂict.
Other chapters in Theoretical Boundaries focus
on the same issue. Marko Milanović assesses the
lex specialis principle, as one tool for resolving
regime conﬂicts. Milanović argues that the principle is misguided to the extent that it reﬂects the
assumption that states “could not possibly have
intended to legislate two hierarchically equal
norms that are ultimately contradictory”
(p. 109). States do in fact “conclude (multilateral)
treaties that, once interpreted and applied to speciﬁc problems, can ultimately conﬂict” (p. 110).
Like Ohlin, Milanović considers such conﬂicts to
be problematic. “This is not an outcome that is
normatively desirable, and it preferably should
be avoided, but it can and does happen” (id.).
But Milanović argues that the lex specialis principle is not a useful tool for resolving regime conﬂicts. He says that, “rather than endlessly
ruminate on the relationship between IHL and
IHRL as a whole,” we ought to “arrive at speciﬁc
rules applying to speciﬁc problems that are clear
and predictable” (p. 116).
Adil Haque also recognizes that “IHL and
IHRL can conﬂict, the former permitting what
the latter forbids. One task, then, is to interpret
speciﬁc norms in a way that avoids or reduces
potential conﬂict between them” (p. 26). For
Haque, conﬂicts between IHL and IHRL
would ideally “be resolved by reference to a
shared moral aim” (pp. 26–27). He offers a
thoughtful analysis of how this might be done.
John Dehn focuses on the question of how states
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may respond to armed attacks by nonstate actors
who operate in ineffectively governed territories.
Dehn “accepts the ambiguity in international
law’s current content and scope” and argues for
creating new norms that clarify this area of the
law (p. 346). In particular, he suggests that states
recognize a right to self-defense in this context
and apply “somewhat of a hybrid IHL/HRL
legal framework” (p. 318).
Multiple authors thus share the view that conﬂict and uncertainty in the law are undesirable
and ought to be corrected. The authors do not
all explain why they hold that view, but Ohlin
does. He contends that an “animating impulse
behind this entire academic endeavor is the
assumption that lack of clarity regarding fundamental principles is a major obstacle toward effectiveness on the ground” (p. 22). That assumption
has a strong pedigree.13 Theorists commonly
posit that vagueness in the substantive standards
of international law undercuts their
efﬁcacy.14 Some theorists go further and suggest
that vague standards lack a deﬁning attribute of
law—that they are not really good law.15 The
logic goes something like this: if a standard is
13
See, e.g., RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS,
SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW 111–12 (2013) (“A
common view is that human rights treaties should
aspire to greater levels of precision to foster compliance
and enforcement.”); Malcolm MacLaren & Felix
Schwendimann, An Exercise in the Development of
International Law: The New ICRC Study on
Customary International Humanitarian Law, 6
GERMAN L.J. 1217, 1240 (2005) (“[I]t is incontestable
on general legal and practical considerations that such
attempts to clarify existing rules can facilitate the rules’
effectiveness and improvement.”).
14
E.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES,
THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 10 (1995)
(“[A]mbiguity and indeterminacy of treaty language lie
at the root of much of the behavior that might seem to
violate treaty requirements.”); Thomas M. Franck,
Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AJIL 705,
714 (1988) (“Indeterminate normative standards not
only make it harder to know what conformity is
expected, but also make it easier to justify noncompliance.”); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based
Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823,
1863 (2002) (“As the uncertainty of an obligation
increases, the reputational cost from the violation
decreases.”).
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too open-ended, it inadequately deﬁnes what is
permitted and what is proscribed, so absent an
authoritative body to determine the law’s content, it cannot effectively guide human conduct
or regulate behavior. As applied to IHL and
IHRL, this is usually taken to mean that the
law cannot meaningfully constrain states or
other actors that might trample on individual
rights.

II. AMBIGUITY AND CONTESTATION
The two scripts that I have described are not
particular to the works under review. Much of
the secondary literature on the relationship
between IHL and IHRL: (1) insists that the law
is fairly straightforward and just needs to be followed, or (2) proposes reforms for making it
clearer. These scripts suggest that, if IHL and
IHRL are to operate as effective law, they must
deﬁne with sufﬁcient clarity the prescribed constraints on human behavior. The implication,
whether intentional or not, is that IHL and
IHRL are not quite working in many contemporary settings in which human security is at risk.
The ﬁrst script places the blame on states, like
the United States, that pursue their own policy
preferences in apparent disregard of accepted
legal standards. That script is suitable for lawyers
in advocacy roles, but the second script exposes
its limits as an analytic tool. If, as the second
script concedes, the law is unsettled, then claims
that states are violating it become less persuasive;
states might just be acting within its interpretive
spaces. According to the second script, the ambiguity is itself the problem. Yet as I discuss below,
this ambiguity is unlikely to be resolved anytime
soon. So, the two scripts together create the
impression that IHL and IHRL cannot
15
E.g., JUTTA BRUNNÉE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE,
LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
351 (2010) (explaining that the criteria of law include
clarity in content and consistency in application);
Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew
Moravcskik, Anne-Marie Slaughter & Duncan
Snidal, The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG.
401, 414 (2000) (“[P]recision and elaboration are
especially signiﬁcant hallmarks of legalization at the
international level.”).
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meaningfully be harnessed in many modern situations of violence.
Perhaps they cannot, but the fact that the legal
practice in this area has been so active for so long
suggests that they are still doing something. Let
me suggest, as a next stage in the research agenda,
that we take this practice more seriously on its
own terms. In other words, rather than start
with a particular jurisprudential vision for IHL
and IHRL, and then begrudge the practice for
falling short of that vision, we might begin with
the practice itself—by examining how, why, and
with what effect IHL and IHRL actually operate
in the world. To be clear, I am not suggesting that
we simply describe or apologize for the practice. I
am suggesting that we evaluate it in terms of the
institutional and cultural contexts within which
it occurs. A critical or normative assessment
would seek to understand the practice as it
plays out before trying to diagnose its virtues or
weaknesses, identify plausible alternatives, or
propose reforms that would be not only viable
but also desirable, once they are implemented.16
16

We can analogize here to the distinction that
some philosophers draw between “practice-independent” and “practice-dependent” theories of human
rights. (I am indebted to Christopher McCrudden
for bringing my attention to this distinction.) In practice-independent theories, the justiﬁcation for and
content of human rights are not constrained by the historically contingent and politically compromised practices that we happen to live with; human rights
principles are derived through other means, like morality or intuition, and then used to assess or try to reform
that practice. Carrying the analogy forward, much of
the work on the relationship between IHL and
IHRL is practice-independent in the sense that it
begins with a jurisprudential vision—an idea of what
law is or how law functions—and then uses that vision
to evaluate the practice. By contrast, practice-dependent theories deﬁne and justify human rights in
terms of the particular institutional or cultural contexts
in which they arise. Such theories ask not whether a
given practice conforms to an externally derived ideal
but what functions it does or might serve in the real
world. The practice-dependent approach is like the
one that I am advancing. For excellent overviews of
this distinction in the philosophical literature, see
Christopher McCrudden, Human Rights: Law,
Politics, and Philosophy (draft manuscript on ﬁle with
author); and Andrea Sangiovanni, Justice and the
Priority of Politics to Morality, 16 J. POL. PHIL. 137
(2008).

1069

A. Discordance in the Legal Practice
A number of the pieces under review recognize
but do not quite grapple with the fact that international law at the intersection between IHL and
IHRL is highly contentious and ﬂuid.17 Contests
over the applicable legal standards persistently
play out through multiple doctrinal forms and
in manifold arenas. Some of these contests, like
the debate about the lex specialis principle, center
on the regime choice. Others assume that one or
the other regime applies and then ask what that
regime does or should require in discrete settings.
It is worth acknowledging just how discordant
this area of international law is. Start with the
basic claim that the substantive standards for
non-international armed conﬂicts derive mostly
from customary IHL and are modeled after the
treaty
law
for
international
armed
conﬂicts.18 This claim is widely accepted at a
high level of generality.19 But its meaning and
relevance remain unstable. IHL experts who
take the claim for granted still have fundamental
differences about how to translate for non-international conﬂicts the IHL that was developed for
international conﬂicts.20 These differences were
apparent, for example, when the ICRC adopted
its 2009 Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of
17

E.g., Dehn at 317 (“Disputes regarding the applicable legal framework stem largely from [a set of normative] disagreements. . . .”); Luban at 49 (“[T]he
legalisms are pretty clearly a stand-in for a broader
debate about the very nature of war and peace and
the laws that regulate them, and that debate is not technical at all.”); Milanović at 78, 81(describing a debate
that is “waged between two camps” of international
lawyers, who exploit the “unbearable” complexity in
the law to advance their preferred policies); Ohlin at
119 (“It is no surprise, then, that the choice of framework question is contentious and bitter.”).
18
JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALDBECK, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, 1 CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, at xxxv (2005)
(“State practice . . . has led to the creation of rules parallel to those in Additional Protocol I, but applicable as
customary international law to non-international
armed conﬂicts.”).
19
See SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, THE LAW OF NONINTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 56–57, 61 (2012).
20
For a discussion of and critique of this method,
see Hakimi, A Functional Approach to Targeting and
Detention, supra note 2.
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Direct Participation in Hostilities.21 The
Interpretive Guidance was meant to clarify an
issue that lies at the heart of IHL: when may
someone be targeted for attack? Instead, it generated a sharp debate on that issue.22
Meanwhile, many global actors question
whether customary IHL, as modeled after the
treaty law for international conﬂicts, is even the
right regulatory framework for modern counterterrorism operations. In this day and age, such
operations are regularly appraised by actors who
are not particularly invested in “pure” IHL—
domestic courts, human rights institutions, and
civil society groups. These actors commonly
either disregard IHL or apply hybrids that mix
it with other sources. The ECtHR has repeatedly
applied IHRL, instead of IHL, to situations that
are also covered by IHL.23 The Israeli Supreme
Court has used domestic law to modify the
norms that, in its view, would have applied as a
matter of customary IHL.24 U.K. courts have
suggested that, unlike the IHL that governs international armed conﬂicts, the IHL for non-international armed conﬂicts does not license
administrative detention.25 Such decisions limit
the practical relevance of any substantive standard of customary IHL that is modeled after
the treaty law for international armed conﬂicts.
21

MELZER, supra note 11.
See, e.g., W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC
“Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: No
Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.
U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 769 (2010); Michael
N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion
of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical
Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 5 (2010);
Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed
Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in
Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L
L. & POL. 641 (2010).
23
E.g., Isayeva v. Russia, supra note 3; Al-Skeini
v. United Kingdom, supra note 6.
24
HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in
Isr. v. Israel, 2006(2) Isr. Rep. 459, 490–95 [2005]
(Isr.).
25
Al-Waheed v. Ministry of Defense & Serdar
Mohammed v. Ministry of Defense, [2017] UKSC
2, Jan. 17, paras. 12–14; see also id., paras. 235(ii),
256–57, 271–76 (dissenting opinion of Lord Reed);
Serdar Mohammed v. Secretary of State for Defense,
[2014] EWCA Civ. 843, paras. 9(ii)(c), 164–253
(U.K. Court of Appeal).
22
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The IHRL side of the ledger is not much
cleaner. For instance, although the ECtHR has
issued several decisions at the intersection
between IHL and IHRL, its reasoning tends to
be incremental, fact-speciﬁc, and at times contradictory. Thus, questions about IHRL’s extraterritorial scope, its content outside law enforcement
settings, its derogation provisions, and its relationship with IHL remain a constant source of
uncertainty and friction—both at the ECtHR
and in other parts of the human rights system.
This presumably is why Milanović describes the
existing doctrinal framework as “simply unbearable” in its complexity (p. 81).
Of course, not all of IHL and IHRL is up for
grabs. Some norms, like the prohibition of torture, are quite strong. They are widely accepted
and treated as law, even though they are also at
times violated. Further, even in areas of contestation, many interpretations remain out of bounds.
No one seriously contends that states may target
to kill people who just happen to live in the same
neighborhood as an insurgent. Yet as applied to
contemporary counterterrorism operations,
large swaths of IHL and IHRL are characterized
not by clarity or settlement but by ﬂuidity and
ongoing contest. Norms that are claimed to be
authoritative are actually unstable, either generally or as interpreted for concrete settings. They
are accepted and treated as law only provisionally,
for discrete operations, by some actors, or in particular venues.26
26
See Christopher M. McCrudden, Is the Principal
Function of International Human Rights Law to Address
the Pathologies of International Law? A Comment on
Patrick Macklem’s The Sovereignty of Human
Rights, 67 TORONTO L.J. 623, 628 (2017) (“Any
legal decision about a contested area of human rights
is often quite provisional and subject to varying degrees
of continuing legal debate and challenge.”);
cf. W. Michael Reisman, The Democratization of
Contemporary International Law-Making Processes and
the Differentiation of Their Application, in
DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY
MAKING 15, 28–29 (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Volker
Röben eds., 2005) (“Because the question of whether
international law will be effective in a particular dispute
will increasingly depend upon the arena or forum in
which the dispute is heard, scholarly and practitioner
statements of what the law is . . . will increasingly
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One reason for that dissonance might be
ambivalence or bad faith. Some states are not
committed to advancing human rights or want
to minimize the constraints on their power. But
surely, another reason is that the questions that
arise at the intersection between IHL and
IHRL are difﬁcult. Global actors who are
invested in these regimes but come at them
from different perspectives or institutional positions naturally disagree about precisely how to
balance the competing considerations that are
at stake. These actors might at times ﬁnd ways
to compromise with or accommodate one
another, but they often do not. There inevitably
are situations in which the relevant interests and
values cannot all be realized, and any “settlement” would be deeply offensive to at least
some of the groups that partake in the IHL and
IHRL project. This means that, even if a proposal
for reform were to be adopted by certain actors or
in speciﬁc venues, it almost certainly would be
challenged or undercut by or in others.

B. Jurisprudential Assessments
Acknowledging that the legal practice in this
area is so discordant taxes the jurisprudential
vision that animates the two scripts that I
described. Recall that these scripts assume that
IHL and IHRL are not quite working as law
when their substantive standards are ﬂuid and
constantly debated because, in that event, their
capacity to constrain human behavior is limited.
Indeed, many international lawyers deﬁne international law in terms of consensus and reconciliation, and in opposition to conﬂict.27 For these
lawyers, persistent disagreement about an issue
evinces an absence of or deﬁciency in law; it
have to be qualiﬁed by reference to where a potential
dispute in the future may initially be characterized in
terms of law and where those characterizations will
thereafter be put to political use.”).
27
The doctrine on sources reinforces this vision
because it deﬁnes international law in consensual
terms. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment,
1986 ICJ Rep. 14, para. 269 (June 27) (“[I]n international law there are no rules, other than such rules as
may be accepted by the State concerned. . . .”).
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betrays that the issue falls more in the political
than in the legal domain.28
Yet that jurisprudential vision is not the only
available one. A prominent school of thought
already conceives of international law as an argumentative practice.29 This school concedes that
international law does not always establish
accepted standards that regulate behavior. Even
so, it can structure a social practice—by establishing texts, institutions, processes, and methods
that global actors use to interact on the issues
that concern them. Their interactions can be
congenial or discordant, but the fact that they
are discordant does not make them just politics
and not law. Law creates a particular kind of practice by prioritizing some modes of interacting
over others.
By the same token, we should not assume
that decisions on contested issues are incompatible with the rule of law just because they
are provisional, incongruous with one another,
or motivated by considerations, like raw power,
that might ideally be external to law. As
Christopher Kutz has explained, legal decisions
still must be defended in law, with reasons that
support them. “The force of such reasons is not
cancelled by the presence of competing
considerations.” 30 Meanwhile, the law’s
28
E.g., ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, THE
INTERPRETATION OF ACTS AND RULES IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (2008) (“[P]olitical considerations are inherently subjective and can be subjectively
manipulated, unlike accepted rules of law.”);
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (6th ed.
2008) (“Power politics stresses competition, conﬂict
and supremacy . . . [while] law aims for harmony
and the regulation of disputes.”).
29
MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO
UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ARGUMENT 565, 567–68 (2d ed. 2006) (describing
international law as a common grammar that does
not necessarily reﬂect the participants’ shared substantive commitments but instead structures an argumentative practice); Ingo Venzke, Semantic Authority, Legal
Change and the Dynamics of International Law, 12 NO
FOUNDATIONS 1, 2, 12 (2015) (arguing that “[t]he law
provides the battleground for competing claims,” such
that “different actors with varying degrees of semantic
authority struggle” over its meaning).
30
Christopher L. Kutz, Just Disagreement:
Indeterminacy and Rationality in the Rule of Law, 103
YALE L.J. 997, 1028 (1993).
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elasticity enables dissenters to resist the policies
with which they disagree and advance competing positions. In the face of deep normative
divisions, that dynamic might further the rule
of law better than any legal settlement does.
An ongoing legal contest allows for the constant airing and balancing of the competing considerations that are at stake. By contrast, legal
settlement risks boxing some constituents out
of the legal project and enabling the rule by,
instead of the rule of, law. The point for now
is that we need not accept a conception of law
that fails to capture so much of the legal practice, especially if the practitioners themselves
insist that they are doing law. Instead, we
ought to question that conception and seriously entertain the alternatives.

C. Practical Assessments
Readers who accept that this kind of practice is
law might still ask whether it is effective law. I do
not intend to answer that question here, but for
those who insist that IHL and IHRL can be effective only to the extent that they establish relatively clear substantive standards that constrain
human behavior, let me underscore three points.
Each warrants further research and analysis.
First, the persistent uncertainties in the law
reﬂect fundamental disagreements about the substantive standards that ought to govern. These
disagreements cannot simply be wished away,
and where they persist, deﬁning the law with
more precision might mean accepting a fairly
low common denominator. This is especially so
because the formal mechanisms for “settling”
international law—and reducing the wiggle
room to advance contentious claims—are statecentric. States, as a group, would have to accept
a new authoritative text that either clariﬁes the
law or delegates substantial lawmaking to a single
institution. Legal clarity is less likely to come
through the process for customary international
law because this process is itself decentralized
and volatile; it is limited in its capacity to clarify
the law when there is an intense and vociferous
normative contest.
Second, if the goal is to improve states’ human
rights records, then reducing the law’s elasticity will
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at times be counterproductive. To be sure, elasticity enables states, like the United States, to evade
the best or most rights-protective interpretation
of the law. But it also enables other actors to
press for their preferred legal positions. In other
words, keeping the law pliable invites groups
with diverse perspectives to continue arguing
through it. And having such disputes might be
the most plausible path for instigating change.
Gráinne de Búrca has recently made a similar
point. She has argued that human rights treaties
inﬂuence state conduct by structuring an argumentative and broadly participatory process in
which discrete policies are continuously developed, evaluated, and adapted in diverse governance arenas.31 In de Búrca’s account, “the
apparent ambiguity in standards and the weakness of enforcement mechanisms . . . can be
seen as important and necessary components of
a properly functioning system” because they create space within which a conﬂictual practice can
thrive.32 The practice on IHL and IHRL does
not perfectly replicate de Búrca’s model for success, but it does contain some of her model’s key
features, at least for states that engage seriously
with the law and have active civil societies.
The experience with U.S. lethal operations
might even be an example of such
success.33 The ofﬁcial U.S. documents in The
Drone Memos and the December 2016
White House Report paint a picture not of bullheaded indifference or obstinacy but of real legal
engagement and modest change.34 For years, the
31
Gráinne de Búrca, Human Rights
Experimentalism, 111 AJIL 277 (2017).
32
Id. at 280.
33
For an argument to this effect, see JACK
GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE
ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 (2012).
34
Jaffer tries to paint a different picture. He
describes a “policy of obfuscation” and “stonewalling”
by an executive branch intent on keeping “[b]asic
information . . . secret even from the courts and
Congress” (p. 25). However, Jaffer also recognizes
that “[c]ontroversy over drone strikes compelled the
Obama administration to discuss the campaign publicly in more detail” (p. 20) and that “the gap between
what the government said was secret and what was
actually secret became increasingly difﬁcult for the government to manage and increasingly difﬁcult for the
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United States reﬁned its counterterrorism policies as it tried to justify them under international
law. Jaffer himself recognizes that “the drone
campaign is saturated with the language of law”
and that “[p]erhaps no administration before
[the Obama] one has tried so assiduously to justify its resort to the weapons of war” (p. 7). The
United States could certainly do more, and critics
will charge that any change was marginal and easily reversible. Even if they are correct, it would
not mean that international law was ineffective.
It might just mean that the contrary positions
were insufﬁciently compelling to prevail, at
least for now.
In any event, the intensity of this normative
contest suggests that legal clarity is not an unalloyed good. Consider two alternatives that
would clarify the law at considerable cost. First,
settling the law as the United States would have
it would inhibit, rather than enhance, the opportunities for ongoing protest and change. It would
mean solidifying standards that are more permissive than many would like. Second, deﬁning the
law as Jaffer does might galvanize more states to
disengage from and openly violate it. For
decades, the central problem in IHL and IHRL
has not been a dearth of authoritative pronouncements on the law’s substantive content. States
sometimes fail to comply even with norms that
are clear and well accepted as law. The central
problem has been that states are, on the whole,
ambivalent about doing as much as possible to
secure human rights. Where the law is ambiguous, it can at least be used to advance claims
that go beyond what states would accept of
their own volition; it can entangle states in the
practice of trying to justify their positions to
other stakeholders; and depending on the circumstances, it can foster organic change. This
change might be provisional and might not
apply equally to all states, but the effect might
still be to enhance human rights in discrete
settings.
courts to ignore” (p. 31). Indeed, the collection of documents that comprise the bulk of the book show that,
largely because of efforts like Jaffer’s, much about U.S.
lethal operations is now publicly available.
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Third, even when IHL and IHRL do not have
that effect, they might do other important work.
For example, they clearly enable a diverse and diffuse set of actors to disagree, in relatively productive ways, about some of the most pressing
challenges to human and national security. I
have argued elsewhere that having those contests
can be valuable, even when they do not lead to
substantive resolution or change.35 Related, IHL
and IHRL might help constitute or galvanize
domestic civil society groups,36 or give people
who are otherwise marginalized from decisionmaking opportunities to voice and justify their
discontent.37 To assess whether the legal practice
at the intersection between IHL and IHRL is effective, we have to examine the many ways in which it
might shape human behavior.

III. CONCLUSION
Although the two familiar approaches on the
relationship between IHL and IHRL can be
productive, even critical, parts of the legal practice, they have real limits. This does not mean
that international lawyers should just abandon
them. Lawyers should continue to criticize or
defend the legality of speciﬁc operations, even
when the applicable standards are unclear.
35
Monica Hakimi, The Work of International Law,
58 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2017); Monica Hakimi,
Constructing an International Community, 111 AJIL
317 (2017); see also McCrudden, supra note 26, at
14 (“[T]he lack of resolution of the contradictions in
the international adjudication of human rights law disputes, for example, is not to be regarded as a failure but,
rather, as an essential element of the practice of human
rights. The practice . . . becomes the site of provisional
and (politically) temporary accommodation that helps
us to live together, despite the basic conﬂicts that are
brought to court.”).
36
See Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights and Minority
Activism in Japan: Transformation of Movement
Actorhood and Local-Global Feedback Loop, 122
AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1050 (2017).
37
See, e.g., Johan Karlsson Schaffer, The Point of the
Practice of Human Rights: International Concern or
Domestic Empowerment?, available at https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2564514
(manuscript at 14) (arguing that human rights are
“power-mediators that provide relatively weak social
agents with normative resources for challenging political authority”).
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But when they do, the rest of us should appreciate that they are acting as advocates, advancing particular claims on the law. We should not
expect their claims to be broadly treated or
accepted as law. Likewise, while lawyers
might at times realize certain gains by pressing
for legal clarity, such clarifying moves are often
limited in effect—relevant only for particular
states, venues, or moments in time—and
might have real downsides. The key analytic
point is that, if we want to understand and
assess IHL and IHRL as social phenomena,
we have to push beyond those approaches.
They tell us little about whether or how the
law is working, what functions or values it is
serving, or how it might realistically be
improved. Tackling these questions requires
taking seriously the actual practice of law,
with all of its messiness and discordance.
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